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Introduction
Since the origin of flight, the military has used aircraft to support military operations. This study focuses on one aspect of that support, the use of aerial delivered munitions in close proximity to soldiers on the ground to support freedom of maneuver. Close Air Support (CAS) and Close Combat Attack (CCA) exercise direct and indirect fires from aircraft to deliver required support and generate flexibility for maneuver operations, yet the procedures are different in the achievement of these similar effects.
The Question
This monograph asks whether these two different procedures can be combined to create one simple procedure to ease the friction that commonly occurs on the battlefield. Answering this question demands asking what factors determine the procedures and what historical accounts shape the current procedures? Finally, are close combat attack procedures a product of the current operating environment or are they abstract enough to apply to other operating environments? The intent is to determine whether or not the procedures can be synthesized by taking the attributes of each and streamlining the process for the end user of these systems. The focus of both close air support and close combat attack procedures is to provide support to land-bound units when and where they need it most. A combination of current operational processes used by the Army and Air Force could ideally provide the capabilities close air support brings combined with the flexibility of close combat attack.
The similar effects achieved by the two methods of fire should drive a common process that would govern the execution of both. However, this is not the case. The determination of why the procedures are different is the root of the issue that will help to evaluate if they can be combined to streamline the effects. In addition to the why, the real problem is how to ensure flexibility is gained and maintained on the ground when the life of the United States soldier, sailor, airman, or marine is involved, how to keep them alive and how to allow them to accomplish their mission.
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the CAS and CCA processes with respect to the maneuver of ground forces and investigate if one process can take the place of the two currently in use. To arrive at an answer this study will reveal several key factors. The first revelation is whether streamlining the two processes into one would be more effective. The second is using historical accounts to determine what drove the processes apart and why the Army adopted the weaponization of rotary wing aircraft. The third revelation hinges on the difference in culture between the two branches of service. The fourth revelation dives deeply into doctrine to analyze the procedures, and how the Air Force and Army view fires from aircraft. Once this analysis is complete, the end state is to determine if the procedures can be combined, or should remain the same as current practice dictates.
Method
This monograph approaches the question qualitatively by analyzing historical, cultural and current process aspects of both Army and Air Force branches of service concerning close air support and close combats attack. This analysis tells a story of whether or not and why the two services should combine the distinct operational processes for tactical control of aircraft. By tying the links of each of the topic sections together, this monograph uncovers an answer to the question.
Significance
This study is significant because it provides key insight into what the current processes are and how or whether they can be improved. Military thought constantly evolves. This analysis is a step in the process of evolution that may create more environmental adaptability while operating through what Clausewitz has termed the "fog of war". Research ideally expands the bank of knowledge and if a new process is uncovered, creates new or revises current knowledge. Practical application is the intent behind the research, to uncover a better way of doing business, or determine if the current ways should be sustained.
Definition of Terms
To avoid confusion, a number of terms must be clarified within the scope of this study. In addition to defining the terms, this study will provide a detailed explanation of the terms and how the terms are relevant. The definitions come from Joint doctrine unless otherwise noted. The key terms inherent to the study of this topic are as follows: close air support (CAS), close combat attack (CCA), close combat, flexibility, maneuver, joint terminal attack controller (JTAC), joint fires observer (JFO) and culture.
Close Air Support (CAS): "Close air support is air action by fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, and requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of those forces." 1 Close air support is indirect fires from aircraft near soldiers that requires detailed coordination to prevent fratricide or civilian casualties. The person calling for fire is responsible for the fire's effects.
Close Combat Attack (CCA): "A hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing air-to-ground fires for friendly units engaged in close combat. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed integration is required." The definition of close combat attack is similar to close air support; the main difference is the consideration of close combat attack by the Army as a direct fire weapon system in which the aircrew is responsible for their fires.
Close Combat: "Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground." 3 Close combat is the premise that guides close combat attack. Close combat as related to aerial platforms is direct fire to enable ground forces to accomplish their mission.
Flexibility:
The term flexibility is used rampantly throughout doctrine, however it is not adequately defined. A definition from the online Merriam-Webster dictionary encompasses the intent of the term: "Flexibility is characterized by a ready capability to adapt to new, different, or changing requirements." 4 Flexibility is the ability to adapt to new and changing conditions as they occur on the battlefield.
Maneuver: "1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war.
3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy." For the scope of the study, a joint terminal attack controller will be termed as an Airman who is specially trained and qualified to provide terminal guidance to aircraft for munitions release.
Joint Fires Observer (JFO): "A trained Service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-tosurface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 close air support terminal attack control, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations." 7 Joint fires observers are Army personnel trained to call for CAS in order to mitigate risk. Joint fires observers are a measure to enable close air support while there is a lack of qualified joint terminal air controllers.
Culture:
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines culture, as it applies to the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, or more specifically organizational culture as "the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization." 8 Culture is the thread that binds an organization together into a coherent entity. Culture provides guiding principles within which an organization acts.
Organization
This study is organized into three different chapters. Chapter One develops the historical context and determines when the two different attack procedures broke from each other. Chapter Two analyzes the cultural differences between the Army and the Air Force that drive the execution of the individual procedures. Chapter Three takes an in-depth look at the Army and Air Force doctrinal processes to determine the differences between the two. 7 Ibid., 183.
History
Close air support finds its genesis in the trenches of World War I. The Army originally adopted the airplane for three purposes. These purposes originally established in Army Field Service Regulation of 1914 were as a method of signal, as adjustment to fire support, and finally as a means of reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance.
9 Pilots with initiative soon determined that the airplane was capable of doing much more than those three simple missions. Whether to centralize or decentralize was another key debate between the services. Centralization of airpower was a key tenet of Air Force doctrine that allowed focusing air assets. The Army wanted air assets decentralized to provide responsiveness for close air support missions to directly support ground forces. The Army likened close air support to artillery, which only required coordination at battalion level while small units had to go through multiple levels to get air support. Multiple coordination levels, little
Army representation in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), a lack of proper equipment and training and fluid situations made centrally controlled close air support difficult to use.
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The third learning point was the execution of joint training. During the interwar period leading to Korea, the lack of focus on close air support did not lend itself to interservice cooperation. This lack of interservice training created difficulties in the initial execution of close air support procedures.
The final learning point was platform centric. Leading into Korea the strategic air command focused fighter aircraft on protecting bombers, which created a gap in capabilities and requirements.
Those fighters, designated multi-role and tasked with providing close air support during the Korean War were not suitable because their basic design was for air to air combat. With the realization of the deficiency the Air Force brought back propeller driven F-51 Mustangs into service for a limited time to provide close air support until they could make adaptations to F-80's, F-84's and F-86's for the role.
Benefits to the propeller driven aircraft were that they could provide longer loiter time, carry more ordinance and stage within the Korean Peninsula.
Upon completion of the Korean War, President Eisenhower's "New Look" policy once again shifted the balance of power back to the nuclear deterrent and thus the strategic air command. This combined with the Army's perceived inefficiencies in air to ground operations caused the Army to look more in depth at their own organic aviation. Reacting to the Korean War experience, the Army expanded the development of its own organic aircraft to fulfill the close air support role and to provide the responsiveness required. United States Marine Corps application of helicopter mobility during the Korean War appealed to the Army; however, at the time all of the Army's aircraft were purchased through the Air Force. The Air Force viewed the Army was taking offensive action to the air which was the Air Force domain and disapproved of the Army's intent to pursue the airmobile concept. 29 After the war though, the strategic focus of the Air Force drew attention away from the Army acquisition of the helicopter for other than transportation roles. The Army in fact was intending to turn the helicopter into a maneuver asset and along with the airmobile concept, continued to test armed aircraft to expand their tactical application on the battlefield. Major General James Gavin was a proponent of using helicopters in a reconnaissance role and his line of thought re-initiated debate between the services concerning the roles of Army aircraft.
Major General Gavin also appointed the first general officer to represent the Army aviation branch, The Army also developed procedures for their own organic assets. While the Army considered aviation assets holistically as maneuver systems, the UH-1 gunships were treated as a fires asset. The fire support officer made calls for fire from Army aircraft on the fire support net. This method worked, however the pilots did not always receive an updated situation on the fires net, which led to a lack of situational awareness and occasional fratricide incidents.
In addition to command and control, the Air Force took large steps in the development of platforms specifically tailored for close air support. The Air Force purchased assets such as the OV-10
Bronco that were capable of long loiter times to control and conduct support, as well as adopting Naval Initiative #24 reaffirmed the Air Force's mission of providing fixed-wing CAS to the Army. It required no implementation or development. That this mission required reaffirmation spoke to the traditional distrust the two services felt toward one another on this issue. Yet, its inclusion in a document advocating a comprehensive integration of the doctrine and means with which the Army and Air Force intended to conduct the next battle acknowledged its basic necessity to both. If the two services followed the intent of this initiative, with the Army trying not to acquire or agitate for its own fixed wing CAS aircraft and the Air Force not only giving to its CAS mission the resources it requires but insisting that its CAS forces display genuine and effective cooperation and coordination with the ground units they support then this initiative may turn out to be the most far reaching of all.
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The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force intended this initiative to ensure the Army and Air Force maintained a relationship of mutual support.
Desert Storm
Desert Storm was a demonstration of airpower through significant amounts of interdiction and upon initiation of the ground campaign, significant amounts of planned close air support. On January 18, 1993, the air campaign against Iraq began. For forty-three days before the ground war began, Air Force air interdiction decimated Iraqi forces to around fifty percent combat effectiveness. On February 24, the ground campaign initiated and the Air Force generated more than 3000 sorties for combined interdiction and close air support to destroy Iraqi targets. The major impact to come of Desert Storm was a revolution in warfare focused on technology.
The focus shifted from platform to the capabilities of the systems on the platform. 45 The system of systems approach enabled sensors to provide up to date data on enemy actions to enable friendly action. First, it re-emphasized the requirement to operate jointly and incorporate all applicable elements into the planning process. Second was improved communications between senior Army and Air Force leaders.
Third was the requirement of tactical air control parties placed within the Army to control Air Force close air support. 51 These lessons helped to prepare the joint forces for the road ahead in Iraq.
Army attack aviation support was also a key player in Afghanistan. Rotary winged aircraft capabilities enabled them to gain enhanced situational awareness and strike targets that were more difficult for faster moving aircraft. 52 In addition to situational awareness, Army attack platforms did not require the use of tactical air control parties to clear fires and were able to act as a maneuver element and operate in close combat. Another primary difference between the Air Force and Army close air support was the weapon systems on the AH-64 allowed for engagement closer to friendly troops. 50 Ibid., 147. 
Conclusion
From World War I to the present, military aviation has had a very controversial past, one that has finally culminated in a successful relationship between services. Flight created the opportunity to operate in the third dimension and military innovators were quick to seize the advantages that dimension offered.
Aircraft roles evolved from reconnaissance and communications to performing interdiction to destroy critical infrastructure in hopes of attaining a decisive victory.
The Army and Air Force rivalry stemmed from the perceptions that the Air Force was a purely strategic force capable of ending a war before ground force commitment while the Army viewed the Air Ibid., 9. To holistically look at the layers of the onion together it is important to understand how national culture and organizational culture relate. According to Hofstede, the practices previously mentioned combine to form the identity of the institution, which then creates and shapes itself within the boundaries of the service values. 62 National culture is defined by Hofstede is the "collective programming of the mind" that comes of growing up within a nation. 63 All of this is tied to the history of the service branch.
Stephen Ott describes organizational culture as:
Organizational culture is the culture that exists in an organization, something akin to societal culture. It is a socially constructed, unseen, and unobservable force behind organizational activities. It is a social energy that moves organization members to act. It is a unifying theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilization for organization members. It functions as an organizational control mechanism, informally approving or prohibiting behaviors. The system in place to command and control the process is the Theater Air Control System (TACS). The theater air control system is the direct tool that "provides the COMAFFOR the capability to plan and conduct joint air operations. 83 Ibid., II-4. 84 Ibid., II-4. 85 Ibid., operations center and as the Army representative to plan, coordinate and deconflict air operations. 86 The battlefield coordination detachment supports Army ground maneuver.
The air component coordination element is the reciprocal of the battlefield coordination detachment. This coordination element is not required, however if one is stood up they will be located on the joint force land component commander's (JFLCC) staff. The air component coordination element is responsible for "exchanging current intelligence, operational data, and support requirements and The wing operation center is the next element in the chain. They are responsible for command and control, and interpreting the air tasking order and accomplish close air support missions as directed.
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Within the Army air ground system, the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) is located at the wing operations center to coordinate with the battlefield coordination detachment.
Two elements allow the Commander Air Force Forces to decentralize execution of close air support missions. The airborne command and control elements include the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar (JSTARS), which allow for control, surveillance and ground situation updates. 89 The control and reporting center is the other decentralizing element and is a ground based radar that links multiple systems together to provide control and surveillance for close air support aircraft. The Army headquarters intent on incorporating close air support into their mission must conduct detailed mission planning to synchronize it. Preplanned close air support is an exercise of operational art in that it synchronizes close air support within the larger framework of the mission. It enables a ground commander to emplace effective fires to facilitate maneuver. Preplanned close air support originates within a tactical air control team or party and is forwarded to the air support operations center or senior Army headquarters. From the senior Army headquarters, the request travels through the battlefield coordination detachment to the air operations center where the decision is made. The decision is then sent from the air operations center the reverse route back to the requestor. 106 Key to this process is the request arriving at the air operations center within the typical 72-96 hour air tasking order (ATO) planning process so the request is vetted through the different stages of the air tasking order cycle if approved.
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As much detail as possible is necessary, but updates are possible as targets develop. Detail is important because close air support aircrews fly missions based on the air tasking order.
Immediate requests are those that occur within the air tasking order cycle. 108 Immediate requests are a tactical response to a tactical situation that may hinder the operational artist's application of operational art by taking assets involved in a plan. Immediate requests are however necessary to ensure survival of personnel, intent and equipment. Immediate requests follow much the same process as preplanned requests but may consume already dedicated assets.
The CCA Model
The Army model for applying organic air assets is somewhat different from the Air Force model.
Instead of the parallel process of the TAACS/AAGS the Army process is unitary because all active duty divisions have organic combat aviation brigades (CAB) they can assign missions to. The Army's air is by nature of their relationship to the supported unit already more integrated into the planning process. The planning process also depends on type of relationship combat aviation brigades have with other Army units. In a general support relationship, the combat aviation brigade supports the division as a whole. In a direct support relationship the combat aviation brigade is able to support other units directly or break up into aviation task forces and provide smaller elements to support Army units. This section details both of the planning processes defined by the relationships, but is limited to applying CAB assets within the division construct.
It is important to define the relationship since that is what predicates the process used. Since close combat attack is an Army application of organic air assets, Army doctrine is the primary source of information. The first portion of this section focuses on the general support (GS) of the combat aviation brigade to the division. According to FM 1-02 general support is "that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof." 109 In other words, the combat aviation brigade supports the entire division it is task organized under. The second portion focuses on the direct support (DS) relationship of a combat aviation brigade or aviation task force to another element. In a direct support relationship the supporting unit is authorized to "answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance." 110 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0.1 breaks the relationship down more clearly. In a direct support relationship the supported unit establishes the priorities; in the case of an aviation task force supporting a brigade combat team, the brigade combat team establishes priorities. 111 The parent unit in a general support relationship establishes the priorities; in the case of a combat aviation brigade, the parent unit is the division.
112
General Support
Within the division construct there are two formal levels that staff requests for attack aircraft. The requesting element forwards their request to the Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) organic to the BCT.
The brigade aviation element then submits the refined request to the division G3 operations aviation section. The G3 aviation then sends the processed request to the combat aviation brigade for execution.
Once approved, the combat aviation brigade forwards the mission to the appropriate battalion or task force headquarters that coordinates directly with the requesting unit through aviation liaison teams to ensure the intent of the operation is accomplished. The timeline of this process is depends on the unit, but typically occurs within a 48-72 hour timeframe.
The brigade aviation element is a critical link in ensuring the transmission of information from requestor to the requested asset. Located within the brigade combat team the brigade aviation element "is a planning and coordination cell whose major function is to incorporate aviation into the ground commander's scheme of maneuver," much like the role of the tactical air control party. 113 While the brigade aviation element is in place to facilitate planning and ensure commander's intent is followed, "The BAE does not take the place of aviation TF involvement in the planning process." 114 The brigade aviation element consists of a brigade aviation officer (BAO), a plans officer, a tactical operations officer (TACOPS), an operations sergeant and specialist. Combined, this cell integrates aviation and conducts lateral coordination with the tactical air control party and fires cell (FC) to ensure airspace is managed appropriately. 115 The brigade aviation element is key to ensuring a process that involves aviation within the ground maneuver planning.
In the general support role, the G3 operations aviation cell coordinates and synchronizes brigade combat team requests. 116 Requests are deconflicted to ensure assets are available and the missions fall 
Conclusion
This monograph demonstrates the long history of the Air Force and Army both working well together and travelling over a rocky path. Army beliefs that all efforts ultimately serve to enable the ground force conflict with the Air Force's view of itself as a strategic force with the ability to limit ground force involvement and potential loss of American lives. 118 The bottom line within this relationship is that the two services must continue to work together to fight and win wars involving the United States.
The history and culture of each branch of service have shaped the way they perform close air support and close combat attack. The root question of this monograph is whether or not those two processes can be combined to streamline the process to make them easier for the soldier on the ground to use finite close air support and close combat attack assets. The simple answer to the question is yes, the two processes The "Air Force model" would likely have the opposite effect. It would likely push Army divisional aircraft up to a higher level to integrate them into the overall theater air plan. Divisional close combat attack assets would become operationally controlled by the air operations center and requests for these assets would have to be pushed through the battlefield coordination detachment for fulfillment and to be placed on the air tasking order. This model would disrupt the flexibility the Army sought during the Vietnam War and take control and integrated planning away from Army commanders.
Control is the major factor that prevents a combination of these two processes. To change the processes to provide additional capability for one service limits the amount of control that service has on its assets. The two models currently in use have served well in the past several years and both provide enough flexibility and capability to accomplish both close air support and close combat attack. The "CAS model" is flexible in application within the air tasking order cycle and allows for bottom up refinement of the mission through layers of cells. The "CCA model" allows for continuous refinement and allows for an integrated planning process down to the crew level.
Each process drives a different picture. The "CAS model" involves integrating tactical assets into an operational plan synchronized within the greater air and ground picture. The Army design involves a tactical asset within a tactical plan synchronized within the greater ground picture. The focus of the two services is different. The nature and limitations of the assets involved limits the scope of the Army viewpoint whereas the Air Force is broader. Air Force assets have the capability to go much further than Army assets. The planning processes should remain the way they are to enable two different mission sets.
